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Abstract 
 
We use financial analyst coverage as a measure of information asymmetry to examine excess firm 
values associated with single- and multi-segment firms.  We explicitly examine whether differences 
in analyst coverage can explain the diversification discount.  We find that information asymmetry 
plays a major role in the valuation of companies and explains a large portion of the diversifica-
tion discount.  However, a significant diversification discount remains after controlling for the ef-
fects of analyst coverage. 
 
 
1.0  Introduction 
 
yers and Majluf (1984) show that in the presence of high information asymmetry between the firm and 
market, firms will forego positive NPV projects rather than go to the external capital market to finance 
projects.  Thus, a major hypothesized benefit of diversification is the creation of internal capital markets.  
Diversification should create internal capital markets with lower levels of information asymmetry that allow firms to 
channel resources to the correct segments and reduce the under-investment problem. 
 
Most empirical studies, however, conclude that on average diversification is a value decreasing activity 
(e.g., Berger and Ofek (1995), Servaes (1996), Lang and Stulz (1994)).  Further, corporate refocusing has been 
found to increase the value of the firm and has been interpreted by some as evidence that firms were trying to undo 
previous mistakes of merger and diversification (e.g., Comment and Jarrell (1995) and Lane, Vikas, and Ranjini 
(1997)).  Consequently, a body of literature on the inefficiency of internal capital markets has recently developed in 
order to explain the “diversification discount” (e.g., Shin and Stulz, (1998); Wulf, (1999); Rajan, Servaes, and Zin-
gales (2000)). 
 
While there is strong empirical evidence that diversified firms sell at a discount to single segment firms, 
there is less empirical as to whether this discount should exist.  For example, several studies report positive market 
reactions to unrelated diversifying acquisitions in different time periods (e.g., Matsusaka (1993), Schipper and 
Thompson (1983), Hubbard and Palia (1999), Hyland (1997)).  Other studies show that the risk-adjusted stock per-
formance of multi-segment firms is at least equal to the returns on single segment firms (Graham, Lemmon, and 
Wolf, (1999) and Lamont and Polk (1999)). 
 
Given the above information, the search for the source of the diversification discount has moved further 
afield.  Much of the research asks how much of a discount, if any, is left after controlling for differences in the cha-
racteristics of diversifying and non-diversifying firms.  Part of this research considers the possibility that informa-
tion asymmetries may be greater for multi-segment firms that for single segment firms.  Nanda and Narayanan 
(1999) formally develop an asymmetric information related model for divestitures that assumes that the market can 
observe the aggregate cash flows of the firm but not the individual divisional cash flows, resulting in misvaluation of 
the firm's securities.  Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999) find that firms that engage in spin-offs have higher le-
vels of information asymmetry compared to their industry and size matched counterparts and the 
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information problems decrease significantly after a spin-off.  They argue the size of gains around spin-offs is posi-
tively related to the pre-spinoff degree of information asymmetry.  Hadlock, Ryngaert and Thomas (1998) examine 
a “transparency hypothesis” that suggests that diversified firms may be harder to value (less transparent) than fo-
cused firms.  They suggest accounting figures reported for focused firms are more informative than those for diver-
sified firms due to the aggregate nature of diversified firms' accounting reports.  Consequently, asymmetric informa-
tion problems would be more severe for diversified firms relative to focused firms.  In a related vein, Dunn and Na-
than (1998) show that as the level of a company's total diversification increases, analysts are less accurate in their 
earnings forecasts and have more inter-analyst disagreement.  Similarly, Lamont and Polk (1999) provide evidence 
that conglomerate firms have higher required returns and that this can account for approximately one-third of the 
empirically observed diversification discount. 
 
This paper explicitly considers the issue of the amount of the diversification discount after controlling for 
the difference in information asymmetry between single- and multi-segment firms.  In this paper, we use coverage of 
the firm by financial analysts as a measure of a firm’s degree of information asymmetry.  We then examine whether 
differences in analyst coverage help explain the diversification discount.  Our results, which cover the period of 
1989-1998, indicate that analyst coverage plays a major role in explaining the valuation of firms.  Both single- and 
multi-segment firms not covered by financial analysts have significantly smaller excess values than firms covered by 
analysts.  Further, regression tests show that the multi-segment discount coefficient remains significant, but is re-
duced by approximately half when analyst coverage is introduced in the analysis. 
 
2.0  Sample Selection and Data Description 
 
FASB No.14 and SEC Regulation S-K require firms to report segment information for fiscal years ending 
after December 5, 1977.  Firms must report audited footnote information for segments whose sales, assets, or profits 
exceed 10 percent of consolidated totals.  The Compustat Industry Segment (CIS) database reports the number of 
different business segments, up to a maximum of 10, defined by the firm under FASB No. 14.  Additionally segment 
information for all Compustat firms other than utility subsidiaries is recorded.  
 
We collect the 1989-1998 data for all firms on the CIS database and use the method suggested by Berger 
and Ofek (1995) to complete the data selection process.  To be included in the sample, firms shall have no segments 
in utility segments (SIC code 4000 - 4999) and financial segment (SIC code 6000 - 6999).  Firms must have sales 
greater than twenty million dollars to be included in the sample.  Because some multi-divisional firms sometimes do 
not fully allocate total firm sales to the segments, occasionally we will see some major differences between total 
firm sales and the sum of segment sales.  To reduce the noise caused by such inconsistency, we further require that 
the sum of segment sales should be within one percent of total sales of the firm.  After the above restrictions, we 
have 38312 segment observations.  
 
Following Berger and Ofek (1995), to examine whether diversification enhances or decreases corporate 
value, we measure the percentage difference between a firm's total value and the sum of imputed values for its seg-
ments as a stand-alone entity.  Mathematically, Extra value = ln(V/I(V)), where V is the firm's total capital defined as 
market value of common equity plus book value of debt, and I(V) is the imputed value of the sum of a firm's seg-
ments as stand-alone entity.  ))/(()(
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mfii AIVIndAIVI , where AIi is the segment I's sale in that year, and 
Indi(V/AI)mf is the industry median ratio of the total capital to sales.  It is based on the narrowest SIC grouping that 
includes at least five single-line businesses with at least $20 million of sales and sufficient data for computing the ra-
tios.  The imputed value of 53.3% of all segments are based on 4 digit SIC code industries, 28.9% on 3 digit indus-
tries, 14.3% on 2 digit industries and 3.2% are unavailable.  To further remove noise from the analysis, we also ex-
clude observations if the calculated extra value is above 1.386 or below -1.386 (actual values either more than four 
times the imputed value or less than one-fourth imputed).  Berger and Ofek (1995) apply three accounting multip-
liers: sales, asset and EBIT and obtain similar results.  We also find similar results with all measures, so we only re-
port those based on using the sales multiplier to calculate excess value of a diversified firm. 
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Empirical evidence shows that financial analysts' earnings forecasts convey important information to inves-
tors (Gonedes, Dopuch, and Penman (1976), Givoly and Lakonishok (1979), and Elton, Gruber, and Gultekin 
(1984)) for further discussion.  Consequently, we apply a covered by analysts/not covered by analysts measure as an 
indication of information asymmetry.  Firms with earnings forecast information available on the Institutional Bro-
kers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) historical data tapes in the final month of the fiscal year are denoted as covered, 
while those with no available earnings forecasts are denoted as being not covered.  The presumption is that firms 
covered by analysts reside in a lower information asymmetry environment that those not covered. 
 
Table 1 contains descriptive information for the final sample of 27683 firm observations (38312 segments).  
The average number of segments per firm for the overall sample is 1.38, while the average number of segments for 
multi-segment firms is 2.70.  The mean number of segments is 1.38 for both firms covered by analysts and those not 
covered by analysts.  Average total assets and sales are much larger for multi-segment firms than for single-segment 
firms.  Mean firm total assets and sales are approximately three times as large for firms covered by analysts than 
those not covered. 
 
 
TABLE 1.  Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Characteristic 
 
All Firms 
Single- 
segment 
Multi- 
Segment 
Not 
Covered 
 
Covered 
Number of observations 
 
27683 21268 6415 6227 21406 
Mean number of segments 
 
1.38 1.00 2.70 1.38 1.38 
Mean firm sales 
 
1192.38 864.41 2321.66 493.26 1436.71 
Mean firm total assets 
 
1001.98 681.40 2105.85 375.28 1221.00 
Mean segment sales 
 
842.64 864.41 767.68 378.40 1004.88 
Mean segment total assets 
 
684.73 681.40 696.21 261.26 832.73 
Sample firms have total sales greater then $20 million and with no segments in utility (sic code 4000-4999) and financial service 
(sic code 6000-6999). The sample includes 27683 observations from 1989 to 1998.  Not covered and covered indicate whether 
analyst forecasts of each firm’s earnings are available in the last month of the fiscal year under consideration. 
 
 
3.0  Test Hypothesis and Empirical Results 
 
3.1  Diversification and firm value 
 
We start with a confirmatory test that examines the relationship between diversification and the value of the 
firm.  We first calculate the average excess value for the overall sample and the sample categorized by diversifica-
tion.  Although, some authors suggest that it is the difference in the line of operation rather than number of segments 
that characterize the essence of diversification, no studies actually show that the number of segments is an inferior 
diversification proxy to other suggested methods.  Thus, in this study we classify firms as diversified if they report 
information for multiple segments. 
 
The results in Table 2 show that the mean and median excess values for the overall sample are essentially 
zero.  Similar to previous studies, the results also show that the mean excess value for single-segment firms is signif-
icantly greater than zero (0.021) while the mean excess value for multi-segment firms is significantly less than zero 
(-0.078).  Further, there is a statistically significant difference between the mean and median values of the two 
groups. 
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4.0  Analyst Coverage and firm value 
 
Table 2 also contains average and median firm excess values for the sample based on financial analyst cov-
erage.  The sample is divided into those firms covered by financial analysts and those not covered.  The average 
excess value for firms not covered is –0.206, which is significantly less than zero.  Covered firms have a mean 
excess value of 0.057 which is significantly greater than zero.  The difference between the group means is statistical-
ly significant at the 1% level.  Further, the absolute difference in mean and median excess values for covered and 
not covered firms is similar to the absolute difference for single- and multi-segment firms.  This suggests that infor-
mation asymmetry may have as great an influence on firm value as diversification. 
 
 
TABLE 2. Excess Value, Diversification and Analyst Coverage 
 
 
 
Number of obser-
vations 
Excess Value Difference-in-means test 
[Median] Mean Median 
All firms 
 
27683 -0.002 0.000 
  
Single-segment 
 
21268 0.021* 0.000 Single/Multi 
12.41* 
[13.17*] 
Multi-segment 
 
6415 -0.078* -0.091 
Not covered 
 
6227 -0.206* -0.215 Not covered/Covered 
31.76* 
[27.47*] 
Covered 
 
21406 0.057* 0.028 
 
*Significant at the 1% level. 
  
 
The sample includes 27683 observations from 1989 to 1998. The significance of mean excess value and the difference-in-means 
is measured using t-statistics.  The difference in medians is tested using the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test for me-
dians. 
 
 
5.0  Diversification, information asymmetry, and firm value 
 
Table 3 shows mean and median excess values for the sample divided by both the diversification and analyst cover-
age variables.  The results show both variables affect value when examined simultaneously.  Mean excess values are 
significantly smaller for firms that are not covered by financial analysts than for firms that are covered.  Further, 
mean excess values for multiple-segment firms are statistically significantly lower than those for single-segment 
firms across all information asymmetry levels. 
 
 
TABLE 3.  Excess Value as Related to Diversification and Analyst Coverage 
 
 
Analyst Coverage 
Diversification Difference-in-Means[Median] 
(Single/Multi) Single-segment Multi-segment 
Not covered 
 
-0.192* 
[-0.195, 4773] 
-0.252* 
[-0.273, 1504] 
3.50* 
[4.16*] 
Covered 
 
0.082* 
[0.046, 16495] 
-0.024* 
[-0.039, 4911] 
12.15* 
[12.60*] 
Difference-in-Means[Median] 
(Not covered/Covered) 
28.54* 
[24.74*] 
13.84* 
[11.30*] 
 
 
*Significant at the 1% level. 
   
The sample includes 27683 observations from 1989 to 1998. The significance of mean excess value and the difference-in-means 
is measured using t-statistics.  The difference in medians is tested using the non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank test for me-
dians. 
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The results clearly show that, on average, excess value is negative for non-covered firms.  These firms ap-
parently exhibit such high levels of information asymmetry that market participants subject both types to substantial 
valuation discounts. 
 
6.0  Regression Analysis 
 
Several studies suggest that there are factors that may affect excess value but are not necessarily deter-
mined by the level of diversification (e.g., Berger and Ofek (1995) and Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997)).  Thus, to 
control for influences other than diversification and information asymmetry we estimate various regression models 
with excess value as the dependent variable.  Similar to Denis, Denis and Sarin (1997) we include several indepen-
dent variables to control for possible biases due to size (log of total assets), profitability (EBIT/sales), and leverage 
(total debt/total assets).  We include Tobin’s Q as suggested by other studies that relate the firm’s growth rate to di-
versification.  Q is calculated as the ratio of the sum of the book value of debt plus the market value of equity and 
the book value of total assets.  Additionally, as suggested by Lang and Stulz (1994), we control for the level of capi-
tal-constraint of the firm.  We include both a dividend dummy, equal to one if the firm pays dividend, and zero oth-
erwise, and the investment level (measured by investment capital/sales) in the analysis. 
 
The effect of diversification is measured by the inclusion of a multi-segment dummy that equals one if the 
firm has multiple segments, and zero otherwise.  Likewise, analyst coverage is represented by a dummy variable that 
equals one if financial analyst information is available for the firm, and zero otherwise.  The possibility of a diffe-
rential diversification effect for covered versus non-covered firms is addressed through the inclusion of a dummy 
variable denoted as multi*coverage.  The variable is equal to the product of the coverage and multi-segment va-
riables (i.e., the variable equals one if the firm is multi-segment and covered by analysts, and zero otherwise).  If 
there is a diversification discount regardless the level of information asymmetry, the coefficient for the multi-
segment dummy variable should be significantly negative.  Information asymmetry effects should be evidenced by 
significant coefficients for the coverage variables. 
 
The regression results are shown in Table 4.  In each estimated model, all control variable coefficients ex-
cept that of the dividend dummy are statistically significant.  Thus, we focus the discussion on the diversification 
and information asymmetry variables.  In model 1, only the multi-segment dummy is included with the control va-
riables.  As in previous studies, the coefficient is negative (-0.0704) and significant at the 1% level.  In Model 2 the 
coverage dummy is included.  The estimated coefficient for the coverage dummy is positive (0.0635) and significant 
at the 1% level.  In Model 2 the multi-segment variable coefficient is slightly smaller in absolute terms (-0.0648), 
but retains the same level of statistical significance. 
 
 
In model 3, all previous variables are retained and the multi*coverage variable is added.  In the regression, the esti-
mated multi-segment dummy coefficient remains negative (-0.0293) but is now less than half its size in previous 
models.  Further, the significance level for the coefficient falls to the 5% level.  The coverage variable coefficient 
remains positive (0.0747) and highly significant.  The multi*coverage coefficient is negative (-0.0497) and signifi-
cant at the 1% level.  
 
Overall, the regression results show that information asymmetry and diversification are significant determi-
nants of firm value after controlling for other influences.  The results indicate that information asymmetry explains a 
portion of the diversification discount since the inclusion of an analyst coverage variable reduces the absolute mag-
nitude of the multi-segment dummy by over half.  However, the multi-segment dummy retains statistical signific-
ance indicating that a significant diversification discount remains after controlling for the effects of analyst cover-
age. 
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TABLE 4.  Regression Tests on Excess Value 
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Intercept 
 
-0.7016 
(0.00) 
-0.7183 
(0.00) 
-0.7293 
(0.00) 
Size 
 
0.0644 
(0.00) 
0.0572 
(0.00) 
0.0576 
(0.00) 
Profitability 
 
0.4051 
(0.00) 
0.4028 
(0.00) 
0.4027 
(0.00) 
Q value 
 
0.2326 
(0.00) 
0.2297 
(0.00) 
0.2296 
(0.00) 
Leverage 
 
-0.2183 
(0.00) 
-0.1954 
(0.00) 
-0.1941 
(0.00) 
Dividend dummy 
 
-0.0015 
(0.83) 
-0.0022 
(0.76) 
-0.0014 
(0.85) 
Investment level 
 
0.2600 
(0.00) 
0.2561 
(0.00) 
0.2555 
(0.00) 
Multi-segment dummy 
 
-0.0704 
(0.00) 
-0.0648 
(0.00) 
-0.0293 
(0.05) 
Coverage dummy 
 
 
0.0635 
(0.00) 
0.0747 
(0.00) 
Multi*Coverage 
 
  
-0.0497 
(0.00) 
 
R-square 0.3316 0.3334 0.3336 
Regressions are estimated using excess value as the dependent variable. The sample includes 27683 observations from 1989 to 
1998.  All test statistics are computed using White’s (1980) heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix.  The p-values for 
each coefficient are shown in parentheses. 
 
 
7.0  Conclusion 
 
We use financial analyst coverage as a measure of information asymmetry to examine excess firm values associated 
with single- and multi-segment firms.  We explicitly examine whether differences in information asymmetry can 
explain the previously documented diversification discount.  Our results indicate that information asymmetry plays a 
major role in explaining the valuation of firms and that analyst coverage explains a portion of the diversification dis-
count.  However, a significant diversification discount remains after controlling for the effects of analyst coverage.   
 
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